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ABSTRACT

Security continues to be a major challenge for cloud computing, and it is one that
must be addressed if cloud computing is to be fully accepted. Most technological means
of securing non-cloud computing systems can be either applied directly or modified to
secure a cloud; however, no integrated model-based methodology is yet available to
analyze cloud security requirements and develop policy to deal with both internal and
external security challenges. This work proposes just such a methodology and
demonstrates its application with specific cases. Cloud assets are represented by highorder object models, and misuse cases together with malactivity swimlane diagrams are
developed to assess security threats hierarchically. Cloud security requirements are then
specified, and policies are developed to meet them. Examples show how the methodology
can be used to elicit, identify, analyze, and develop cloud security requirements and
policies using a structured approach, and a case study evaluates its application by a cloud
service provider. Finally, the work shows how the prevention and mitigation security
policies presented here can be conveniently incorporated into the normal functionality of
a cloud computing system.
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1. I TRODUCTIO

Like all computing systems, cloud computing systems that consider security from
the initial requirements and design stages are more secure than those that address security
only once the system is in place. Nonetheless, security requirements are generally not
analyzed early enough in the system development process, and few organizations
proactively safeguard sensitive business information stored in the cloud because they lack
cloud-specific security policies [15]. Due to the complexity of the cloud environment,
effective testing demands that nonfunctional requirements such as those related to
security be analyzed and policies be developed early to address them in the development
process using a comprehensive approach that considers the entire cloud.
The unified modeling language (UML) [6] that is most often employed to elicit of
requirements was not initially designed to capture nonfunctional requirements such as
security requirements. As explained in Section 2 below, existing methods to analyze
security requirements do not consider both internal and external threats in a structured
manner. They focus entirely on external misusers and rely only on security technologies
such as network monitoring systems, intrusion detection and prevention systems,
firewalls, antivirus systems, and data leakage protection.
Internal threats have steadily increased over the past few years, and cloud
computing is not necessarily any more secure internally than noncloud computing
environments. Internal misusers generally have more knowledge of and access to data
and applications than do external misusers. Although internal threats cannot be entirely
eliminated, some effective barriers can be developed to mitigate them.
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It is crucial, therefore, to use a top-down approach based on a clear policy to
analyze security requirements and develop effective security policies. Although security
policies themselves do not solve problems, and in fact can actually complicate things if
they are not clearly written and consistently observed, policies do define an ideal toward
which all organizational efforts should point. Therefore, a systematic methodology and
process are necessary to analyze security requirements and develop security policies for
cloud computing systems. This methodology must identify security requirements at
multiple levels to address threats, through user scenarios, posed by both internal and
external misusers and thus to develop clear cloud security policies that ensure the security
of the cloud environment. The process presented here employs the high-order objectoriented modeling technique [2] together with use cases [6], misuse cases [9] and
malactivity swimlane diagrams [8].

1.1. BACKGROU D OF CLOUD COMPUTI G
Cloud computing has emerged in recent years as a new and important computing
paradigm; it is gaining increased attention in the service computing community.
According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the cloud computing
model grants convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable
computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can
be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider
interaction [4]. Cloud computing is still evolving; therefore, its definitions, applications,
underlying technologies, issues, risks, and benefits continue to be refined.
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Cloud service providers (CSPs) deliver applications and services that run in the
cloud; that is to say, they are accessible through the web. A key attraction of cloud
computing services is that they conceal the complexity of the infrastructure from
developers and end users. Hence developers and users do not know or need to know what
is in the cloud – they require only that it deliver the services they need. CSPs offer three
basic services: infrastructure as a service (IaaS), platform as a service (PaaS), and
software as a service (SaaS). All these services offer scalability and multitenancy. In
addition, they are self-provisioning and can be deployed through private, public,
community, or hybrid cloud deployment modules.

1.2. HIERARCHICAL CLOUD ARCHITECTURE
This section presents background information on various architectural elements
that form the basis for cloud computing. Figure 1.1 shows a hierarchical design of cloud
computing architecture. The figure is best explained from the bottom up. At the bottom is
the system level, which serves as a foundation and the backbone of the cloud. It consists
of a collection of data centers that supply the computing power in the cloud environment.
At this level, there exist enormous physical resources such as storage disks, CPUs, and
memories.
Just above the system level is the virtualization level. Virtualization, the factor
that facilitates cloud computing, is an abstraction of applications and services from the
underlying physical services. It is achieved with the help of a hypervisor, a software or
hardware that serves as a bridge between physical devices and virtual applications. This
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abstraction ensures that no application or service is tied directly on the hardware
resources. This level manages the physical resources and allows sharing of their capacity
among virtual instances of servers, which can be enabled or destroyed on demand. The
physical cloud resources and their virtualization capabilities form the basis for delivering
IaaS.
The user-level middleware includes software-hosting platforms such as Web 2.0
Interfaces that permit developers to create rich, cost-effective user interfaces for webbased applications. It also provides the programming environments and tools that ease the
creation, deployment, and execution of applications in clouds. This level aims at
providing PaaS capabilities.

Cloud Applications
User Level

Webmails

Document Management

Hosting Platforms

User-Level
Middleware

Web 2.0 Interfaces

Virtualization
Level

System Level

Social Computing

Host VM Partition

Databases

Development and Testing

Guest VM Partition

Guest VM Partition

Hypervisor

Disk

NIC

Memory

Figure 1.1. Hierarchical Cloud Computing Architecture

CPU
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The top user level focuses, as its name suggests, on providing application services
by making use of services provided by the lower levels. It provides SaaS capabilities.
SaaS or PaaS services are often developed and provided by a third party distinct from the
IaaS provider [16].

1.3. THE HIGH-ORDER OBJECT-ORIE TED MODELI G TECH IQUE
(HOOMT)
The HOOMT addresses a challenge faced by requirement analysts and software
engineers to develop well-structured object-oriented software systems [2]. It incorporates
the object-oriented paradigm seamlessly into a structured analysis [2]. It also permits the
development of object, functional, and dynamic models hierarchically according to their
abstraction levels. The process eliminates incompatibility between a flat object model, in
which all modeling elements are analyzed at a single level of abstraction, and hierarchical
functional and dynamic models, in which modeling elements are analyzed at multiple
levels of abstraction. It uses hierarchical decomposition in the analysis and design of
object functionality and dynamic behavior. HOOMT also has a unique starting point and
incorporates nonfunctional requirements. It has three models: the high-order object model
(HOOM), the hierarchical object information flow model (HOIFM), and the hierarchical
state transition model (HSTM). This work uses HOOM extensively to model the assets of
the target system (i.e., the cloud) hierarchically. Liu, Lin and Dong [2] described
HOOMT notation in detail.
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2. RELATED WORK

Although there has been much discussion of cloud computing security concerns,
few studies have focused on security policies. Hanna [1] proposed a streamlined security
analysis process to capture and analyze security requirements in cloud computing. His
method identifies the assets to be protected and the attacks that could be mounted against
these assets. It then identifies countermeasures. The process prevents or mitigates threats
posed to the cloud by external misusers; however, it gives little consideration to threats
posed by internal misusers, especially those who have authorized access.
A number of proposals address security concerns early in the development
lifecycle. Ware, Bowles, and Eastman [10] offer a methodology to elicit security
requirements using common criteria and use cases. Their work extends existing UML use
case notation used to model requirements so that it can capture actor threats. Their
approach identifies potential threats by developing actor profiles and identifying threats
based on relationships among actors in a use case [10]. Sindre and Opdahl [9] also extend
use cases, which describe what a system should do, to misuse cases, concentrating on
what should not happen in a system. Their approach combines both use-case diagrams
and misuse-case diagrams in a single diagram and introduces new relationships like
prevents and detects. Sindre [8] has also developed malactivity swimlane diagrams, using
them to capture attacks that could complement misuse cases and thus permitting early
elicitation of security requirements. His technique permits the inclusion of both hostile
and legitimate activities.
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3. SECURITY CHALLE GES FACED BY CLOUD COMPUTI G SYSTEMS

Because its applications and services are delivered through the internet, cloud
computing is prone to various kinds of external security risks such as denial-of-service
(DoS) and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. In addition, and particularly in
the public cloud deployment module, since data is hosted by the CSP, trust,
confidentiality, and privacy are also important issues. Finally, communication among
clouds must be secured to prevent man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks.
Although data stored in the cloud and other compute capabilities are not actually
in the cloud; they reside in data centers housing hundreds of servers, thousands of
networking cables, and other physical devices. Nonetheless, physical threats are among
the greatest dangers to the cloud. Most CSPs are acutely aware of these threats to their
core IT infrastructure from natural disasters, terrorist threats, fire, sabotage, and other
phenomenon.
CSPs, especially IaaS providers, offer their customers the illusion of unlimited
compute, network, and storage capacity, often coupled with a frictionless registration
process that allows anyone with a valid credit card to register and begin using cloud
services immediately [12]. The relative anonymity of these registration and usage models
encourages spammers, malicious code authors, and other misusers, who have been able to
conduct their activities with relative impunity. PaaS providers have traditionally suffered
most from such attacks; however, recent evidence shows that hackers have begun to
target IaaS vendors as well [12].
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Researchers, however, have not generally operated on the notion that security
should be built around the application, not the virtual machines; therefore, hypervisors
are not sufficiently robust. Further, since communication with the hypervisor contains
vital information, including account names and passwords, it must be secure. Like
physical computers on a physical network, virtual machines have identical IP addresses.
Nearby addresses, which are visible to users in the cloud, often share the same hardware.
Thus, a misuser can determine which physical servers a victim is using within the cloud,
implanting a malicious virtual machine at that location from which to launch an attack
[5].
Finally, in a virtualized environment, it is relatively easy to steal an entire virtual
server, along with its data, without anyone noticing. Virtual machines are encapsulated in
virtual disk files that reside on a virtual host server; therefore, anyone with the right
permissions can copy the disk file and access data on it.
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4. THE APPROACH

4.1. FRAMEWORK OF THE STRUCTURED DEVELOPME T OF CLOUD
SECURITY POLICIES
This section describes the approach used here to analyze security requirements
and develop security policies in a cloud computing environment. It involves two phases:
First, cloud security requirements are analyzed. Second, cloud security policies are
developed, and measures are put in place to communicate and enforce them. Figure 4.1
shows a high-level view of the approach.

Cloud Security Requirements Analysis Process

Cloud Security Requirements
Meet

Map
(1 .. N)

Cloud Security Policies

Cloud Security Policy Development Process

Figure 4.1. A High-Level View of the Approach

As noted above, the HOOMT, which is a major aspect of this approach to the
analysis of cloud security policies, provides a structured object-oriented design
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methodology based on hierarchical model development (see figure 4.2). HOOMT allows
every object in the cloud to be modeled comprehensively and verified systematically for
completeness. The analysis process introduced here integrates use cases, misuse cases,
and malactivity swimlane diagrams with the HOOM. The malactivity swimlane diagrams
decompose misuse cases, revealing in detail the activities of misusers. Also, detailed
investigation of each incidence of malactivity permits development of more ways to
prevent or mitigate such malactivity. This technique serves as a countermeasure for
identified threats. Moreover, more threats can be identified this way; making possible the
development of comprehensive cloud security policies. The result is a more efficient way
to discover threats posed to cloud computing systems, both internally and externally. The
structured development of the cloud security policies together with the relationships
among the various diagrams at each level is shown in figure 4.2.

4.2. CLOUD SECURITY REQUIREME TS A ALYSIS
Figure 4.3 outlines the process of analyzing to cloud security requirements. The
process begins with the development of a context object diagram (COD) for the cloud
computing system; this is considered as a high-order object. This COD represents the
entire cloud computing system and shows its interactions with external objects such as
users, either internal or external. The COD also serves as the starting point for the
analysis process.
The next step is to identify use cases that describe how the cloud computing
system responds to requests from users. These cases capture the behavioral requirements
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Figure 4.2. Framework of the Structured Development of Cloud Security Policies
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of the cloud computing system with detailed scenarios derived from the cloud’s
functionalities. Next, each use case is analyzed thoroughly to determine how it could be
subverted. Based on this analysis, misuse cases and misusers, either internal or external,
that can harm the cloud computing system are identified. The misuse cases also reveal the
various threats posed to the cloud at each level of the hierarchical model.
To identify security requirements that can serve as countermeasures to these
misuse cases, the actions taken by misusers must be understood in detail. Malactivity
swimlane diagrams can be used to further decompose misuse cases. Decomposition
reveals the details of such misuse events and thus permits identification of more threats.
It also permits the inclusion of both hostile and legitimate activities and determines the
point at which prevention and mitigation options can be added to these activities to serve
as countermeasures. Based on the countermeasures, security requirements are specified.
The COD is further decomposed and the cycle repeated, generating cloud security
requirements at the end of every cycle. The term decompose refers to a process that
reveals the subcomponents of the cloud object at a lower level [3]. The decomposition
and security requirements analysis process continues until a stage is reached at which the
cloud objects are primitive and corresponding use and misuse cases are fully explored
[3]. At that point, the cloud security requirements are refined by checking for
inconsistencies and ambiguities. They serve as a deliverable at the end of the first phase
of the approach.
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Develop a context object diagram for the
cloud computing system
Specify use case(s) to show interactions
between the users and the cloud
Specify misuse case(s) to identify threats posed
to the cloud

More
misuse
cases?

No

DECOMPOSE
high order object

Yes
Decompose with malactivity swimlane diagram
and develop prevention or mitigation options
Develop cloud security requirements

Is high order
object
PRIMITIVE?
?

No

Yes
Refine cloud security requirements

Figure 4.3. Cloud Security Requirements Process

4.3. CLOUD SECURITY POLICY DEVELOPME T, COMMU ICATIO A D
E FORCEME T
In this work, the security policies for cloud computing systems are based on the
cloud security requirements through the security requirements analysis process. Policies
and requirements are not necessarily mapped one-to-one. Usually, one requirement can
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be satisfied by a set of security policies. These requirements are high-level statements of
countermeasures that will adequately prevent or mitigate identified misuse cases and are
dependent on rigorous analysis of threats to the cloud at each level [17], as described
above. Consequently, security policies are developed and integrated into the development
of the cloud computing system. This approach provides a framework of best practices for
CSPs and makes security policies tenable. The policies ensure that risk is minimized and
that any security incidents are met with an effective response [17]. The process of
developing these policies permits authorized security personnel to monitor and probe
security breaches and other issues pertaining to cloud security.
The process begins with a statement articulating the motivation for developing
such a policy, describing the malactivities to be governed by it, and listing the cloud
assets to be protected. The problem the policy is designed to resolve is articulated. In
general, the overall benefit of the policy is described. Next, those individuals or groups
who must understand and observe this policy in order to perform their job are identified.
Any exceptions to this policy are also noted.
At this point, the policy itself is articulated, including a description of what is
actually covered by the policy, the responsibilities of the various individuals or groups
involved, and the technical requirements that each individual or device must meet to
comply with the policy.
Finally, once cloud security policies have been developed, they must be
disseminated to users, staff, management, vendors, third party processors, and support
personnel. The complexity of the cloud environment demands that some, if not all,
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policies be communicated to consumers. Enforcing these policies is also an essential part
of the process. This is accomplished by establishing a record that those involved have
read, understood, and agreed to abide by the policies, and by discussing how violations
will be handled. Figure 4.4 illustrates the process described above to develop security
policies for cloud computing systems.

Motivation for the policy.

Identify mal-activities being governed
& cloud assets being protected.
Individuals or groups who must
understand & observe the policy.

Policy

Communicate and Enforce

Yes

Requirement
changes?

No

Figure 4.4. Cloud Security Policy Development Process
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5. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES

The example described here illustrates how the proposed approach analyzes
security requirements and develops security policies for cloud computing systems. This
example involves a company that wants to create a cloud computing system to provide
data hosting and processing services for the healthcare industry throughout the United
States. As a CSP, this company understands the importance of secure and timely access
to data for such an industry. The company also wants to maintain its own secure, state-ofthe-art data center to house the servers, networking equipment, backup power systems,
and other tools necessary to deliver fast, secure, and effective data services. The approach
described here was used to develop a security policy document for this potential CSP.
First, the cloud was considered an object, and a COD was developed for it. The
COD shows the relationship between the cloud object (i.e., the target system) and
external objects including the CSP, the contingency, and the cloud end user (CEU).
Natural contingencies like tornados, floods, and earthquakes can affect the availability of
the cloud, as can human (intentional) actions like terrorist attacks. At this point, the cloud
object is considered a high-order object; therefore, it can be decomposed into two or
more high-order and or primitive objects. Figure 5.1 shows the COD of the cloud.
Next, the cloud object is decomposed to reveal its constituent objects. This
represents the first level of the process, the point at which analysis of security
requirements begins and the associated security policies are developed. The cloud object
is decomposed into three high-order objects and one primitive object. The high-order
objects are an application and related services, a hardware system, and virtualization. The
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only primitive object is the service management. Decomposition of the cloud object
reveals not only its constituent objects but also shows the relationships among them. See
figure 5.2.

Contingency
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types_of _hardware
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type
name
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compute()
store_patient_info()
reconfigure()

manages
response of time,
reliability, availability
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Cloud
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(CSP)

Cloud
End User
(CEU)
provides

Figure 5.1. The COD of the Cloud Object

At this point, both use cases and misuse cases are specified. Figure 5.3 represents
the use case-misuse case diagram of the cloud object. At this level, the misusers, whether
contingency or intentional, trigger the following four misuse cases: destroy hardware
system, change hardware settings, DDoS attack, and unauthorized data access. These
misuse cases disable or distort the provisioning or consumption of the cloud and involve
both internal and external misusers.
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Figure 5.2. Decomposition of the Cloud Object
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Figure 5.3. Use-Case/ Misuse Case Diagram at the Cloud Level

A malactivity swimlane diagram is developed for each misuse case to further
decompose them. Sindre [8] offers a detailed description of the malactivity swimlane
diagram notation. For demonstration purposes, the misuse case of unauthorized data
access (an internal threat) will be decomposed at this level (see figure 5.4). In this
scenario, an unauthorized user (e.g., a member of the cleaning staff) who has stolen an
authorized user’s badge enters the network operations center (NOC). A security staff
member allows the cleaning staff access to the NOC. This security staff member is also
considered a misuser because he is assumed to have connived with the cleaning staff
member in this operation. The cleaning staff member then guesses the login information
and retrieves confidential patient information.

20

Misuser Activities
Cleaning
Staff

Security
Staff

Patient
Database

Security
Rule

CCTV
Camera

Cleaning
staff must
work in
groups

Steals
badge

Enters
NOC

Prevention/Mitigation Options

Multifactor
authentication

Allows
cleaning
staff

Captures
Activity
Guesses
login
info

Retrieves
patient
info

Grants
access

Strong
authentication
with one-time
password

Figure 5.4. Malactivity Swimlane Diagram for the Unauthorized Data Access Misuse
Case together with the Prevention or Mitigation Options

As shown in figure 5.4, decomposing misuse cases with malactivity swimlanes
reveals the details of activities performed by the misuser. Thus, it is possible to determine
the point in the process at which mitigation or prevention can be added. For instance, in
order to prevent guesses of login details, the CSP can implement a strong authentication
system with one-time password rather than just a username and password authentication.
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Such an authentication method uses information sent in a short messaging service (SMS)
to the user as part of the login process.
Once all misuse cases are decomposed and their respective mitigation and
prevention options specified, security requirements are also developed. Figure 5.5 shows
the top-level security requirements for the cloud object.

Top-Level Cloud Security Requirements (CSR):
CSR 1.1: The system must provide physical protection to all physical hardware.
CSR 1.2: The system must employ multifactor authentication with a one-time
password for CEUs to prevent intrusion.
CSR 1.3: The system must monitor network requests so that any kind of distributed
denial of service (DDoS) attack can be detected.
CSR 1.4: The system must audit and log CEUs, recording who logs in, when, and
from where in order to recover from a breach.
CSR 1.5: The system must encrypt data in transit in order to prevent vital data from
reaching unauthorized users.

Figure 5.5. Security Requirements at the Cloud-Object Level

With these security requirements, it should now be possible to determine what
kind of security policies must be developed. This is done such that for every security
requirement is met by at least one associated security policy. Figure 5.6 shows an
example of a security policy that meets CSR 1.5.
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Data-in-Transit Encryption Policy
1.0 Purpose
This document describes the encryption of data in transit to ensure the information
security of the cloud. Encryption is designed to prevent unauthorized disclosure of
vital information.
2.0 Scope
This policy applies to any data in transit.
3.0 Policy
All data in transit must be encrypted, and such data must be protected to prevent
their unauthorized disclosure and subsequent fraudulent use.
4.0 Enforcement
Any employee found to have violated this policy may be subject to disciplinary
action, up to and including termination of employment.
5.0 Definitions
Data in transit refers to any data transferred in the cloud.
6.0 Revision History
09/24/2010 - 1.0 initial policy version, Kenneth Fletcher

Figure 5.6. Security Policy to Meets CSR 1.5

The cloud security requirement analysis and policy development process then
continues at the second level. The virtualization object is of particular interest in this
research since virtualization is the main driver of cloud applications and services. Figure
5.7 shows the decomposition of this object into four primitive objects, and the
relationships among them. The objects are the hypervisor, the virtual network system, the
resource management system, and the virtual machine (VM).
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Figure 5.7. Decomposition of the Virtualization Object

Also at this level, use cases and misuse cases are specified. Four use cases were
identified: create VM, reconfigure, network VMs, and manage VMs. The misusers, either
contingency or intentional, initiate plant malicious VM, VM escape, and change VM
settings misuse cases. Figure 5.8 shows the use case-misuse case diagram. At this level,
the VM escape misuse case is further decomposed with the malactivity swimlane
diagram. Security prevention and mitigation options are specified in the decomposition as
shown in figure 5.9. Plant malicious VM, and change VM settings misuse cases are also
decomposed and their respective security prevention and or mitigation options specified.
Security requirements are also specified; these are shown in figure 5.10. Once these
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requirements are obtained, security policies are developed to meet them. For example,
figure 5.11 shows a cloud security policy developed to meet CSR 2.1.
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Figure 5.8. Use-Case/ Misuse-Case for the Virtualization Object

Securing the hardware system is just as important as securing the virtualization
system. At the third level, the hardware system object is analyzed and further
decomposed into the following four primitive objects: hardware devices, network
management system, cooling system, and power system. Figure 5.12 shows the highorder object model for the decomposed hardware system object decomposed and the
relationship among its primitive objects.
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Figure 5.9. Malactivity Swimlane Diagram for the VM Escape Misuse Case together
with the Prevention or Mitigation Options

Second-Level Cloud Security Requirements (CSR):
CSR 2.1: The system must restrict physical and logical access to the hypervisor to
prevent VM from having direct interaction with hypervisor.
CSR 2.2: The system must employ efficient load balancing techniques to prevent
VMs from causing denial of service (DoS) attacks.
CSR 2.3: The system must implement authentication of network flow such that a
guest VM cannot monitor other VMs.
CSR 2.4: The system must monitor guest-host VM interaction for improper
configuration changes, and in the event of any such incident it should
report to the network manager.

Figure 5.10. Security Requirements at the Virtualization-Object Level
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Hypervisor Access Policy
1.0 Purpose
This document describes cloud information security’s required encryption of data in
transit. This is designed to prevent unauthorized disclosure of vital information.
2.0 Scope
This policy applies to all nonhost virtual machines in the cloud.
3.0 Policy
All data in transit must be encrypted, and data covered by this policy must be
protected to prevent their unauthorized disclosure and subsequent fraudulent use.
4.0 Enforcement
Any employee found to have violated this policy may be subject to disciplinary
action, up to and including termination of employment.
5.0 Definitions
Data in transit – Data transferred in the cloud.
6.0 Revision History
09/24/2010 - 1.0 initial policy version, Kenneth Fletcher

Figure 5.11. Security Policy to Meet CSR 2.1
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Figure 5.12. Decomposition of the Hardware System Object

Supply power, network hardware devices, and supply hardware are the three use
cases specified at Level 3. Threats at this level of the cloud are mostly physical. The
misusers, either contingency or intentional, initiate five misuse cases, including destroy
network devices, destroy power devices, change power configuration, destroy cooling
systems, and change temperature configuration. Figure 5.13 is a use-case/ misuse-case
diagram for this level.
Here, the destroy power devices misuse case is decomposed further with a
malactivity swimlane diagram. Figure 5.14 shows this diagram together with the security
prevention options that are specified to prevent or mitigate such threats. The security
requirements that are developed at this level are shown in figure 5.15. Finally, the
security policy designed to meet CSR 3.2 is shown in figure 5.16.
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Figure 5.13. Use Case-Misuse Case for the Hardware System Object
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Figure 5.14. Malactivity Swimlane Diagram for the Destroy-Power-Devices Misuse
Case together with the Prevention or Mitigation Options
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Third-Level Security Requirements:
CSR 3.1: The system must routinely monitor power quality and load in order to
detect any change in power configuration.
CSR 3.2: The system must routinely monitor temperature in order to detect any
change in temperature configuration and maintain constant cooling of
hardware devices.
CSR 3.3: The system must routinely monitor and detect coolant or water leaks in
order to prevent destruction of power devices, cooling systems, cables,
and other hardware.

Figure 5.15. Security Requirements at the Hardware System Level

Physical Devices Monitoring Policy
1.0 Purpose
This policy is intended to protect the CSP against loss of service by providing
constant monitoring of hardware devices.
2.0 Scope
This policy applies to all physical devices, including but not limited to power and
cooling devices.
3.0 Policy
All hardware devices shall be checked manually on a daily basis and recorded.
4.0 Enforcement
Any employee found to have violated this policy may be subject to disciplinary
action, up to and including termination of employment.
5.0 Revision History
09/24/2010 - 1.0 initial policy version, Kenneth Fletcher

Figure 5.16. Security Policy to Meet CSRs 3.1
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6. CASE STUDY

Section 5, explained how cloud security requirements can be analyzed and
security policies developed. Here, the proposed approach is applied to a real case study
involving a cloud service provider whose name has been omitted due to confidential
reasons. The objective is to analyze the company’s current security state and provide
advice on strengthening the security of its cloud.
The company, headquartered in St. Louis, Missouri, offers highly available
business solutions, including colocation, cloud computing, managed services, and
insourcing in a carrier-class data center facility. The private cloud computing
environment provides access to resources from storage, virtual servers, and desktops to
email and mobile devices, all on an as-needed basis. These systems are powered from
their own platform supported by a 30,000-square-foot state-of-the-art data center in St.
Louis. In order to provide a geographically diverse redundancy system as a backup for
the primary data center, the service provider operates another data center in Cincinnati,
Ohio.
The private cloud offerings of the company fall primarily in the IaaS space,
although it offers a number of applications that are delivered and consumed by clients on
a variable per-use basis.
The security requirements analysis process begins by developing the COD of the
private cloud. Because St. Louis, Missouri, is an earthquake zone, the cloud is vulnerable
to natural contingencies. Figure 6.1 shows the COD and the relationships among the
objects.
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Figure 6.1. COD of the Private Cloud Object

The private cloud object is decomposed into four subobjects: three high-order
objects and a primitive object. The high-order objects are services, hardware resources,
and the VMware vSphere. The only primitive object is service management.
Decomposition of the cloud object reveals not only its constituent objects but also the
relationship among them (see figure 6.2).
Figure 6.3 represents the use-case/ misuse-case diagram of the private cloud at the
cloud level. The following three misuse cases were identified: destroy hardware, change
hardware settings, and unauthorized data access. These misuse cases subvert the supply
hardware, reconfigure system, and store data use cases, respectively.

32

manages
provides

Store_data()

uses

Services

enables

Sales &
reconfigure()
Service
disaster_recovery()
Management bill_users()

manages

manages
no_of _CPUs
total_disk_space

no_of_VMs
VMware create_VMs()
vSphere network_VMs()
manage_VMMs()

Hardware supply_power()
Resources network_devices()
cool_devices()

provides

abstracts

affects

Figure 6.2. Decomposition of the Private Cloud Object

Use Cases

Store data

Misuse Cases

disclose

Unauthorized
Data Access

disable

Destroy
Hardware

Intentional

Client
Reconfigure
system

disable

CSP

Supply
Hardware

Change
Hardware
Settings

Earthquake

Figure 6.3. Use-Case/ Misuse-Case for the Private Cloud Object
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The cloud service provider for this case study understands its datacenter as
belonging to its clients and therefore permits clients access to it. With this setup, internal
threats are likely to be the main security issue at this level. Therefore, the unauthorized
data access misuse case is decomposed here to find determine how such a setup could be
compromised and develop prevention or mitigation options to serve as countermeasures.
Figure 6.4 is a malactivity swimlane diagram describing a scenario in which one
client (client A) goes into the data center to steal another client’s (client B) hard drive and
access confidential data on it. The decomposition clarifies the activites of client A and
makes it easier to prevent them. The prevention or mitigation options specified in figure
6.4 are translated into security requirements, which are shown in figure 6.5. These are the
security requirements specified at the first level of the private cloud. Figure 6.6 shows a
security policy to meet CSR 1.2.
At the second level of the security requirements analysis process, the VMware
vSphere object (the virtualization layer) is analyzed. Figure 6.7 shows its decomposition
and the relationship existing among its four constituent primitive objects. The objects are
VMware ESXi hypervisor, vCenter server, virtual machine, and application services.
Also at this level, use cases and misuse cases are specified. Three use cases were
identified: create VM, vstorage, and manage VM host. The intentional misuser, whether a
cloud user or the CSP itself, initiates DoS attack, VM escape, MITM attack, and redirect
packets misuse cases. Figure 6.8 shows the use-case/ misuse-case diagram. At this level,
the MITM attack misuse case was further decomposed with a malactivity swimlane
diagram.
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Figure 6.4. Malactivity Swimlane Diagram for the Unauthorized Data Access Misuse
Case together with the Prevention or Mitigation Options

Private Cloud Object-Level Cloud Security Requirements (CSR):
CSR 1.1: The system must provide hardware monitoring alarms for all physical
hardware.
CSR 1.2: The system must audit and log client and visitor access to the data center,
recording who logs in and when in order to recover from a breach.
CSR 1.3: The system must encrypt data at rest in order to prevent vital data from
reaching unauthorized users.

Figure 6.5. Security Requirements at the Private Cloud Level
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Customer and Visitor Data Center Access Policy
1.0 Purpose
The purpose of this document is to provide guidance for customers and visitors to the data
center, as well as for employees sponsoring visitors.
2.0 Scope
This policy applies to all customers and visitors to the data center and to employees who
sponsor visitors.
3.0 Policy
3.1 Check-In
All visitors must arrive at a designated check-in entrance (i.e., the main reception desk) and
present government-issue photo identification at time of check-in.
All visitors must be met by their employee sponsor at the time of check-in. Visitors must
sign a “Visitor Agreement.” All visitor electronics will be checked in as well.
3.2 Badges
Customer and visitor badges must be worn at all times. Employees are instructed to
immediately report anyone not wearing a customer, visitor, or employee badge.
Visitors requiring access to areas controlled by swipe card access locks should be assisted by
their sponsoring employee.
3.3 Photographs and Cameras
Customers and visitors are not permitted to take photographs inside the data center, without
specific prior arrangement with sponsoring employees.
3.4 Check-Out
Visitors will check out at the same station where they arrived. All visitor electronics will be
checked out.
3.5 Exit Inspection
Visitors may be subject to a brief search of their laptop bags or other luggage as they exit the
data center.
4.0 Enforcement
Violation of any part of this policy by any employee will result in suitable disciplinary
action, up to and including prosecution and or termination.
Violation of any part of this policy by any visitor can result in similar disciplinary action
against the sponsoring employee, and can also result in termination of services or
prosecution in the case of criminal activity.
6.0 Revision History
09/24/2010 - 1.0 initial policy version, Kenneth Fletcher

Figure 6.6. Security Policy to Meet CSR 1.2.
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Figure 6.9 shows this decomposition together with the prevention or mitigation
options. The standard MITM ARP cache spoofing attack is still an issue with the
VMware vSpehre object. This attack occurs when a victim thinks the attacker is the
default gateway and the actual default gateway thinks otherwise.
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Figure 6.7. Decomposition of the VMware vSphere Object

During the course of this attack the victim sends packets to the attacker (default
gateway) who then copies the information, stops it, or at worst changes the contents of
the frame itself. The modified or copied frame is sent to the unsuspecting default gateway
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(actual) for further processing. When the receiving packet returns, the data can be
similarly intercepted.
Other misuse cases identified here were also decomposed and their respective
security prevention or mitigation options specified. Security requirements for this level
are shown in Figure 6.10. Finally at this level, security policy to meet CSR 2.1 is
developed as shown in figure 6.11.
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Figure 6.8. Use-Case/ Misuse-Case for VMware vSphere Object

38

Misuser Activities
Cloud
End User

Cloud
End User

Sends packets

Copies packet
information

VM Server

Prevention/Mitigation Options
Security
Rule

Security
Support

Strong
Encryption
Receives
packet and
sends it

Receives
packet

Copies packet
information

Sends receive
packet

Detects attack

Figure 6.9. Malactivity Swimlane Diagram for the MITM Attack Misuse Case together
with Prevention or Mitigation Options

VMware vSphere Object-Level Cloud Security Requirements (CSR):
CSR 2.1: The system must isolate all traffic to and from storage repositories (datain-motion) from other nonstorage traffic.
CSR 2.2: The system must not allow VM repositories or datastores to be accessible
to other VMs except for the VM host servers.
CSR 2.3: The system must restrict physical and logical access to the hypervisor to
prevent VM from having direct interaction with hypervisor.
CSR 2.4: The system must employ efficient load balancing techniques to prevent
VMs from causing denial of service (DoS) attacks.

Figure 6.10. Cloud Security Requirements at the VMware vSphere Object Level
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Data-in-Motion Isolation Policy
1.0 Purpose
The purpose of this policy is to meet CSR 2.1, which defines the isolation of data in
motion in order to prevent MITM attacks when using and managing virtualization
with VMware vSphere technologies.
2.0 Scope
This policy applies to any data-in-motion
3.0 Policy
All data in transit must be isolated by employing storage area network (SAN)
connectivity, that is, a network of servers and storage devices independent of the
ethernet network.
4.0 Enforcement
Any employee found to have violated this policy may be subject to disciplinary
action, up to and including termination of employment.
5.0 Definitions
Data in transit refers to data transferred in the VMware vSphere vStorage medium.
6.0 Revision History
09/24/2010 - 1.0 initial policy version, Kenneth Fletcher

Figure 6.11. Security Policy to Meet CSR 2.1.

Finally, the hardware resources object was analyzed and further decomposed into
the following four primitive objects: hardware devices, network management system,
cooling system, and power system. The high-order object model for the hardware
resources object and the relationship between its primitive objects are represented in
figure 6.12.
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Figure 6.12. Decomposition of the Hardware Resources Object

Supply power, network hardware devices, and supply hardware are three use
cases specified at the hardware resources level. Threats at this level of the private cloud
are mostly physical. The misusers, contingency and intentional, initiate five misuse cases,
including destroy network devices, destroy power devices, change power configuration,
destroy cooling systems, and change temperature configuration. Figure 6.13 shows the
use-case/ misuse-case diagram for this level.
Here, the destroy power devices misuse case was decomposed further with a
malactivity swimlane diagram. Figure 6.14 shows this decomposition together with the
security prevention or mitigation options for this threat. Figure 6.15 shows the security
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requirements that were developed at level 3. Also, figure 6.16 shows the security policy
developed to meet CSR 3.1.
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Figure 6.13. Use-Case/ Misuse-Case for the Hardware Resources Object
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Figure 6.14. Malactivity Swimlane Diagram for the Destroy Power Devices Misuse Case
together with the Prevention or Mitigation Options

Hardware Resources Object-Level Cloud Security Requirements (CSR):
CSR 3.1: The system must routinely monitor power quality and load in order to
detect any change in power configuration.
CSR 3.2: The system must routinely monitor temperature in order to detect any
change in temperature configuration and maintain constant cooling of
hardware devices.
CSR 3.3: The system must routinely monitor and detect coolant or water leaks in
order to prevent destruction of power devices, cooling systems, cables,
and other hardware.

Figure 6.15. Security Requirements at the Hardware Resources Object Level
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Periodic Maintenance Policy
1.0 Purpose

The purpose of this document is to define the standards for effective maintenance of
the private cloud’s assets so that equipment remains safe at all times.
2.0 Scope

This policy applies to all equipment serving the CSP’s data center.
3.0 Policy
3.1 Maintenance Standards
Each piece of equipment will be allocated an importance rating of 1 - 5. Maintenance
standards will vary depending on the importance of the facility, per the guide below:
1. Not important: Carry out only essential maintenance.
2. Low importance: Defer non-essential maintenance where possible.
3. Fair importance: Carry out maintenance based on risk assessment.
4. Important: Maintain to the best standard that resources allow.
5. Very important: Maintain to a very high standard.
3.2 Maintenance Categories
Each equipment must be categorized as one of the following: preventive maintenance,
statutory maintenance, corrective maintenance, or backlog maintenance.
4.0 Enforcement
Violation of any part of this policy by any employee will result in suitable disciplinary
action, up to and including prosecution and or termination.
5.0 Revision History
09/24/2010 - 1.0 initial policy version, Kenneth Fletcher

Figure 6.16. Security Policy to Meet CSR 3.2.
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7. CO CLUSIO S A D FUTURE WORK

Cloud computing is becoming popular and represents the future of computing.
Before it can be embraced by individuals and enterprises, however, the issue of security
must be addressed. Early consideration of security in cloud computing systems places it
on a par with other functional requirements of the system and significantly improves the
security of the system. This work has successfully addressed these security issues, by
developing a process to determine security requirements and develop policies for a cloud
computing system level-by-level in a structured manner. This methodology analyzes
security requirements by identifying threats posed by misusers both external and internal
to a system. The process was applied here to typical cloud architecture to demonstrate its
function and it was further applied to an actual case study of a cloud service provider in
St. Louis, Missouri. In each case, misuse cases at three different were identified.
Malactivity swimlane diagrams for these misuse cases were generated, permitting
development of countermeasures for prevention or mitigation. Security requirements
were then derived based on the prevention or mitigation options. Finally, security policies
were developed to meet at least each requirement.
Developing comprehensive cloud-specific security policies is a very difficult task
that requires collaboration and insight from many individuals in various areas of
expertise. This is very important because the cloud architecture is very broad. If not
written clearly and consistenly observed, cloud security policies can actually complicate
things rather than helping to prevent or mitigate security issues in cloud computing.
Enforcing cloud security policies are difficult and require management, employee, and
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user support. Also, due to the difficulty that enforcing secuirty policies bring, it is harder
to evaluate security compliance in cloud computing. For future work, I will research into
and develop cloud-specific security metrics in order to quantify security in cloud
computing to find out how safe the cloud is from time to time.
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